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4Executive summary 
Increasing the rate of return of third country nationals 
without a legal right to remain in the EU was a priority 
of the 2014-2019 European Commission. In September 
2018, the Commission proposed the first recast of the 
Return Directive since its entry into force in 2010. The 
European Parliament’s draft report and the Council’s 
partial general approach then followed in 2019. While 
it is still unclear in what form this file will be taken up 
by the new legislature, return will clearly remain a key 
policy objective. This will involve both an acceleration of 
return procedures and an expansion of cooperation with 
third countries on readmission.
The new legislative cycle provides an opportunity to 
rethink EU return and readmission policy. In particular, 
its compliance with international legal obligations, 
most notably the principle of non-refoulement, merits 
renewed attention. The EU and its member states 
have an obligation to ensure that a return order does 
not lead to refoulement, either directly or indirectly. 
Nevertheless, several trends are at play that create a 
growing accountability gap over return and readmission, 
and amount to structural shortcomings in their efforts to 
prevent refoulement. This applies across return policy, 
in particular to the recast Return Directive proposals, 
and recent readmission agreements.
First, the scrutiny and procedural safeguards involved in 
returns have been reduced in order to expel individuals 
faster. Several elements in the Commission’s proposal for 
a recast Return Directive, as well as the Council’s position, 
would significantly weaken procedural safeguards for 
returnees. These relate, in particular, to the right to appeal 
and assessments of the risk of refoulement. 
Similarly, efforts to accelerate readmission cooperation have 
led to the proliferation of informal readmission agreements. 
These arrangements limit democratic scrutiny, since they 
do not need to be made public nor debated and approved 
by national or European parliaments. Furthermore, the 
uncertainty over whether they create legal rights and 
obligations makes it difficult to exercise judicial scrutiny 
over their contents. The agreements that have emerged from 
this accountability gap include several states experiencing 
ongoing conflict or that are refugee-producing.
Second, the predominant bilateral nature of readmission 
cooperation has created new challenges. The 
responsibilities between the EU and member states 
for specific readmission agreements are increasingly 
blurred in order to deflect accountability. Several 
agreements have mobilised EU bodies and resources in 
their implementation, while avoiding the appropriate 
institutional scrutiny faced by EU agreements. The 
difficulty in identifying responsibility in these cases 
creates a blind spot for democratic accountability and has 
implications for judicial scrutiny.
At the same time, persistent discrepancies remain 
between member states’ return practices. The lack of 
standardised information on returns poses challenges 
for the public and policymakers to determine who is 
being returned, how, and to where. More importantly, 
member states have differing understandings of what 
constitutes a safe third country. One state may sign a 
readmission agreement with, and conduct returns to, a 
country that others would deem unsafe. In the absence of 
harmonisation, several countries have suspended Dublin 
transfers to member states where there was a risk of 
onward deportation to unsafe countries. This diminished 
interstate trust leads to an ineffective migration policy 
and puts individuals at risk of refoulement.
Third, no system is in place to track individuals 
following their expulsion, so member states cannot 
guarantee their safety. The lack of monitoring 
mechanisms prevents a comprehensive evaluation 
of readmission agreements’ compliance with non-
refoulement. It also hinders the inclusion of suspension 
clauses or conditions on returnees’ protection in 
readmission agreements. Considerations of the risk 
of indirect refoulement are strikingly absent. Several 
partner countries lack functional asylum systems, or 
have been repeatedly accused of conducting collective 
expulsions in violation of non-refoulement. Certain 
harmful practices are sometimes actively promoted: 
EU member states have frequently encouraged third 
countries to accelerate returns and establish their own 
readmission agreements, including with countries that 
would be considered unsafe.
The recast Return Directive risks further diminishing 
control over the outcomes post-return. First, it 
introduces limitations on voluntary departure. Second, 
the Council’s position seeks to introduce a possibility 
of returning third country nationals to countries other 
than those of origin or transit. These trends further 
restrict possibilities for monitoring and increase the risk 
of indirect refoulement.
The diminishing safeguards in return policy and 
readmission cooperation should be considered jointly, 
since they lead to an overall accountability gap over 
the consequences of return, potentially amounting to 
violations in international law. Reversing these trends 
to comply with international law and protect returnees 
from persecution must become a priority in the EU’s 
next legislative cycle. To that end, the paper’s key 
recommendations include the following:
q  Reconsider the strategy of prioritising informal over 
formal cooperation in the next legislative cycle.
q  Establish post-return monitoring in their agreements 
with third countries.
q  Conduct an evaluation of formal and informal 
readmission agreements at EU and national level that 
fully reflects their implications, including compliance 
with non-refoulement.
5q  Agreements should not be concluded with countries 
that are at risk of violating the principle of non-
refoulement either directly or indirectly. All 
agreements should include a suspensive clause.
q  Targeted support towards partner countries’ asylum 
and reception systems should promote fundamental 
rights compliance in readmission cooperation.
q  The recast Return Directive should recognise the 
notion of indirect refoulement, and discourage member 
states from conducting returns to countries where the 
third country national has no meaningful connection.
q  Efforts should be made to prevent perilous national 
return practices and readmission agreements.
q  The recast Return Directive must ensure that effective 
remedies exist, including an appropriate period for 
appeals in all procedures.
q  Voluntary departure must continue to be prioritised over 
forced return, including an appropriate period to return.
q  Better public data on return practices is needed from 
member states.
Introduction
The return and readmission of migrants without a legal 
right to remain has long been a cornerstone of the 
European Union’s (EU) migration policy. The rhetoric 
that effective expulsion is a prerequisite for the integrity 
of an asylum and migration system has been prevalent 
in EU statements.1 As political consensus in other areas 
becomes harder to secure, return is quickly becoming 
a political priority for the EU. 
However, like other aspects of migration policy, returns 
are not without risks. Individuals subject to return 
decisions may have particular vulnerabilities or be 
subject to persecution upon their deportation. The 
European Commission and member states have 
the duty to ensure that fundamental rights are 
fully complied with within the framework of their 
international obligations. This includes, particularly, 
respect for the principle of non-refoulement. 
This discussion paper focuses on the risk of 
refoulement in return operations and readmission 
cooperation with third countries. Whereas return 
refers to the process governing expulsion from a 
member state’s territory, readmission concerns the 
act of a third country accepting the (re)entry of that 
individual. Refoulement is understood as the expulsion 
of individuals to countries where they may face 
persecution. 
The paper provides a critical analysis of the latest policy 
developments governing readmission cooperation and 
return policy, including the recast Return Directive 
proposal currently under negotiation. It begins by 
outlining the state of play in return and readmission, as 
well as member states’ legal obligations with respect to 
the principle of non-refoulement. Sections 2 to 4 then 
provide a critical examination of the risks involved. 
On that basis, the paper finds that, as a consequence 
of the importance increasingly awarded to effective 
returns, the Commission and member states’ 
policies are creating a growing accountability gap. 
This applies across return policies and readmission 
practices, and particularly concerns their compliance 
with the obligation to prevent both direct and indirect 
refoulement. This reduced accountability takes several 
forms, which are discussed in turn in this paper and 
outlined briefly below.
q  First, procedural safeguards are increasingly 
diminished in order to accelerate returns. 
Regarding return, increasing attempts to curtail 
access to effective remedies and existing safeguards 
within return procedures lead to potential breaches 
of the non-refoulement principle. Regarding 
readmission, cooperation with third countries is 
becoming ever more informal and, consequently, 
frequently bypasses democratic and judicial scrutiny.
q  Second, significant divergence remains between 
member states’ return practices. EU mechanisms 
are sometimes strategically avoided when pursuing 
controversial agreements that are EU-wide or involve 
the Union, leading to a blurring of responsibility 
over their outcomes. At the same time, problematic 
bilateral agreements continue to be concluded 
without EU guidance and with limited data.
q  Third, there is a lack of suitable monitoring 
mechanisms within return practices and 
readmission agreements. This hinders the EU 
and member states’ ability to guarantee returnees’ 
safety. Rather than addressing this shortcoming, 
the recast Return Directive proposal further reduces 
opportunities for monitoring by proposing to restrict 
voluntary departures, while heightening the risk of 
indirect refoulement. 
These three trends amount to structural 
shortcomings in EU and member states’ 
efforts to prevent refoulement.
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EU and member states’ efforts to prevent refoulement. As 
the emphasis on increasing the rate of returns continues, 
and as the future of the recast Return Directive in the 
next legislative cycle becomes clearer, addressing the 
system’s structural deficiencies will be crucial. This paper 
seeks to contribute an analysis of the risks at hand so that 
they can be better addressed in existing and future return 
and readmission policies.
1.  Return, readmission and non-refoulement:  
State of play
1.1   RETURN AND READMISSION 
Return and readmission have become increasingly 
important tools of migration management for the EU. 
The prolonged standstill in discussions over the Common 
European Asylum System (CEAS) reform package, 
particularly on questions of responsibility-sharing, 
highlights the challenges to building political consensus 
on the internal aspect of the EU’s migration policies. 
This deadlock has prompted a greater focus on border 
management and the external dimension of migration. In 
this context, return and readmission are taking centre 
stage as a policy objective where consensus between 
member states can be more easily forged.2
One notable development in EU return and readmission 
policy is that this priority is echoed across a range 
of recently adopted instruments. These include 
the recast of the Visa Code, which enables member 
states to pressure third countries into cooperating 
on readmission by using visa policy as leverage,3 and 
recent changes to the European and Border Coast Guard 
Regulation, which incorporates an expanded returns 
mandate for the EU’s border agency.4 Above all, however, 
the political importance of returns is most centrally 
present in the reform of the Return Directive currently 
under negotiation and, second, in ongoing efforts to 
secure readmission agreements with third countries 
concerning the practical operation of these returns. In 
what follows, this section discusses the relevant recent 
developments in the EU’s return policy and readmission 
cooperation. Their interaction with the principle of  
non-refoulement is further explored in the remainder of 
the paper.
To begin with, return operations in the EU are guided 
by the Return Directive (2008/115/EC).5 The Directive 
was borne out of the culmination of a series of efforts 
in the early 2000s aimed at harmonising standards and 
coordinating operations regarding returns, including 
on the mutual recognition of return decisions and the 
organisation of joint return flights.6 The Directive sets 
out common standards and procedures for member 
states to apply when returning third country nationals 
who do not have a legal right to remain in the EU. These 
include timeframes for return procedures, procedural 
safeguards, guidelines on voluntary departure, as well 
as indications and minimum standards on the use of 
detention or entry bans.
The Commission has issued several communications on 
the implementation of the Return Directive in recent 
years. All of them, most notably the 2017 Renewed 
Action Plan on a more effective return policy, were 
aimed at increasing the rate of returns and addressing 
the consistently large gap between issued return 
decisions and actually executed returns.7 The rate of 
effective returns to third countries has remained at 
36-37% since 2014 (exceptionally at 45.8% in 2016),8 
yet drops to a low 27% if returns to the Western Balkans 
are excluded.9 The low rate of returns is largely due to 
practical challenges, such as in identifying returnees’ 
nationality, and to a lack of cooperation from third 
countries, such as in issuing travel documents.10 Return 
and readmission are therefore closely linked and belong 
to the same policy framework: for returns of third 
country nationals to be successfully executed, third 
countries must be willing to accept them.
The Commission advanced a goal last year of achieving 
a “return rate of at least 70% by 2020”.11 Given the 
practical limitations outlined above, this would entail 
a drastic escalation of return efforts. Accordingly, 
in September 2018, the Commission proposed the 
first recast of the Return Directive since its entry 
into force in 2010.12 The proposal identifies as key 
challenges the inconsistencies in member state 
practices, a lack of cooperation from third countries, 
and a lack of cooperation from returnees.13 It aims 
to expedite returns by expanding the grounds for 
detention, broadening the use of entry bans, expanding 
returnees’ obligations to cooperate, and introducing 
accelerated return procedures at border posts. 
The European Parliament issued its draft report in 
response to the proposal in January 2019,14 followed 
by a substitute impact assessment by the European 
Parliament Research Service (EPRS).15 The report is 
generally very critical of the Commission’s proposal, 
particularly as regards detention and safeguards across 
return procedures. However, the Parliament report 
was never voted on in the Civil Liberties, Justice and 
Home Affairs (LIBE) Committee and its rapporteur, 
Member of the European Parliament (MEP) Judith 
Sargentini, no longer holds office following the May 
2019 elections.16 The fate of the report and the next 
steps remain uncertain pending the start of the new 
Parliament’s term. The Council agreed on a partial 
general approach in June 2019. Several of its changes to 
the Commission’s proposal were aimed at strengthening 
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entry bans from five to ten years and allowing member 
states to charge returnees for the cost of their detention 
and removal.17 In other respects the Council improves 
protections, such as in the amended definition of 
absconding, granting more than one level of appeal, 
or in additional safeguards for minors and families.18 
This agreement excluded provisions on the accelerated 
border procedure, since these are linked to the Asylum 
Procedures Directive, currently under discussion.19 At 
the time of writing, it is unclear when, and in what form, 
the next EU legislature will take up the discussions 
again. Nevertheless, it is already clear that developing 
a “more robust system of readmission and return” will 
remain a priority for the Commission.20  
Developing a “more robust system of 
readmission and return” will remain a 
priority for the Commission.
A second key element of return policy is cooperation 
with third countries on readmission. Although 
bilateral agreements, negotiated by member states with 
individual third countries, constitute the majority of 
readmission agreements,21 the Commission was granted 
the competence to negotiate agreements at EU level in 
1999. Since then, it has signed 18 formal readmission 
agreements with the following third countries: Hong 
Kong, Macao, Sri Lanka, Albania, Russia, Ukraine, 
Macedonia, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Montenegro, 
Serbia, Moldova, Pakistan, Georgia, Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Turkey, Cape Verde, and Belarus.22
These agreements assist in operationalising return and 
readmission processes of third country nationals. They 
may include a country’s own citizens, those who crossed 
it in transit, stateless people, or other states’ nationals. 
While readmission of one’s nationals is arguably an 
obligation under customary international law, it is not 
always fulfilled.23 Readmitting one’s own nationals is 
often expensive and politically unpopular, in part 
because it undermines a long-term source of income 
through remittances.24 Citizens abroad may provide 
remittances even if they are in an irregular situation, 
and sums can be substantial.25 A public backlash led 
Mali, for example, to withdraw from an agreement 
in 2016.26 Furthermore, the vast majority of these 
agreements also seek to secure commitments to readmit 
nationals of non-contracting state parties (for example, 
of neighbouring countries that are unsafe or unwilling 
to readmit them), and therefore go beyond established 
international obligations.27 This, too, can be unpopular 
in third countries and pose barriers in readmission 
negotiations, particularly since there is no guarantee 
that their countries of origin would eventually take them 
back, leading to fears of economic burdens.28
It should be noted, however, that signing a readmission 
agreement is distinct from actually conducting returns 
to a country. Readmission agreements by themselves do 
not obligate expulsion and must be complemented by 
thorough case-by-case assessments of each returnee’s 
circumstances.29 In addition, several studies suggest that 
readmission agreements are not particularly successful 
tools for expediting returns. For example, funding 
commitments or the promise of visa liberalisation may 
insufficiently compensate for the costs of readmission 
mentioned above, they may fail to account for practical 
or logistical difficulties, or they could be poorly 
implemented by EU member states.30
In addition to formal readmission agreements, the EU and 
its member states often pursue informal arrangements 
or joint statements containing clauses on readmission. 
These are administrative or political in nature and exist at 
both EU and national level. They include Joint Migration 
Declarations, Memoranda of Understanding, Joint Ways 
Forward, Standard Operating Procedures or Good Practices. 
Like formal agreements, they affirm states’ commitments 
to readmitting their nationals (or others) and establish 
procedures to carry out returns in practice. Since 2016, 
the EU has reached at least 11 informal agreements (10 
operational, since Mali withdrew):
Country Format of Informal 
Cooperation
Date
The Gambia31 Good Practices 08/05/2018
Ethiopia32 Admission Procedures 05/02/2018
Bangladesh33 Standard Operating 
Procedures
25/09/2017
Guinea34 Good Practices 24/07/2017
Mali35  
(subsequently 
withdrew)
Joint Migration 
Declaration
11/12/2016
Belarus36 Mobility Partnership 13/10/2016
Afghanistan37 Joint Way Forward 02/10/2016
Cote d’Ivoire38 Joint Migration 
Declaration
16/04/2016
Ghana39 Joint Migration 
Declaration
16/04/2016
India40 Common Agenda on 
Migration and Mobility
29/03/2016
Turkey41 Joint Statement 18/03/2016
 
Source: own compilation based on EU official documents and the “Inventory of 
European Union Agreements linked to Readmission” created by Jean-Pierre Cassarino.42
 
The Commission is currently pursuing additional 
agreements. Its primary focus lies in Africa, where the 
Migration Partnership Framework provides a format for 
structured cooperation and where rates of return are 
currently least effective, reaching a low 15% in Central 
and Eastern Africa.43 Negotiations on readmission 
cooperation are ongoing with Morocco, Tunisia, Nigeria 
and China, and until recently with Algeria and Jordan.44 
There have also been regular discussions on readmission 
as part of the Partnership Framework with the 
8programme’s identified priority countries of origin and 
transit (Niger, Mali, Nigeria, Senegal and Ethiopia).45
1.2   NON-REFOULEMENT
The principle of non-refoulement entails the notion 
that individuals should not be sent back to a country 
where they may face persecution. It was first recognised 
by Article 33 of the 1951 UN Convention relating to the 
Status of Refugees (the Refugee Convention).46 Nowadays 
it is considered to be a core tenet of refugee and human 
rights law and is firmly enshrined across regional 
and global conventions, including Article 3 of the UN 
Convention against Torture (CAT)47 and Articles 6 and 
7 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political 
Rights (ICCPR).48 The obligation to protect individuals 
from being sent to countries where they face a risk of 
persecution is also embedded in regional European 
legal instruments. Article 3 of the European Convention 
of Human Rights (ECHR) has been interpreted by 
the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) as 
encompassing a prohibition of refoulement.49 The EU’s 
commitment to non-refoulement is echoed in Article 
19 of the EU Charter of Fundamental Rights, Article 
78(1) of the Lisbon Treaty (TFEU),50 across the relevant 
Directives,51 and in agreements with third countries. 
The prohibition on non-refoulement 
applies whether it happens directly or 
indirectly following a return order.
The existence of an obligation to avoid refoulement 
for EU member states, therefore, is not controversial. 
Rather, the discussion concerns the scope and precise 
implications that stem from this obligation. To 
begin with, the exact circumstances that constitute 
refoulement are subject to debate. Taken jointly, the 
conventions listed above, and to which all member 
states are party, cover persecution, torture, and inhuman 
or degrading treatment or punishment.52 Jurisprudence 
by the ECtHR and CJEU has often interpreted the 
definition of refoulement to include the risk of flagrant 
denial of justice,53 serious mental or physical illnesses,54 
or extreme cases of generalised violence.55
A related discussion as to the obligations derived from 
the principle of non-refoulement concerns indirect or 
‘chain’ refoulement. Even if, in the context of return 
operations, member states refrain from returning 
migrants to countries that may persecute them, a risk 
remains that returnees are expelled onward to countries 
where a risk of persecution exists. This domino effect 
constitutes indirect refoulement. UNHCR advisory 
opinions56 and comments on the implementation of the 
CAT57 have repeatedly stressed that the prohibition on 
non-refoulement applies whether it happens directly 
or indirectly following a return order. Similarly, the 
ECtHR and CJEU have repeatedly affirmed states’ 
duty to avoid refoulement, even when it happens 
indirectly through secondary expulsion.58 In their 
rulings, both courts affirm that the first expelling state 
is responsible for conducting an assessment of the 
risks associated with a return decision, and determine 
that the receiving state will not expose the individual 
to risk of ill-treatment or refoulement. States fall foul 
of their obligations if they “knew or ought to have 
known” such a risk existed.59 This assessment must be 
conducted in consideration of all available evidence 
on conditions in the country and the quality of asylum 
processes, including reports from UNHCR, the European 
Asylum Support Office (EASO) and civil society.60 States 
cannot merely rely on either diplomatic assurances 
from third countries or their being a signatory to the 
relevant conventions, but rather are expected to conduct 
individual assessments.61 Against this background, 
the following sections proceed with an assessment 
of the extent to which the obligations to avoid direct 
and indirect refoulement have, to date, been duly 
accounted for in ongoing return policy and readmission 
cooperation.
2.  Evading procedural safeguards
Efforts to accelerate returns have been accompanied 
by attempts to diminish accountability over how 
the relevant procedures are conducted. The scrutiny 
and procedural safeguards involved in returns are 
being reduced in order to expel individuals faster. 
First, the drive to reform the Return Directive risks 
undermining existing safeguards on assessments of 
refoulement and the right to appeal at national level. 
At the same time, readmission cooperation is becoming 
increasingly informal and, consequently, frequently 
bypasses democratic and judicial scrutiny. Both trends, 
particularly when taken jointly, increase the risk of 
individuals being returned to persecution.
2.1   UNDERMINING EFFECTIVE REMEDY IN 
RETURN PROCEDURES
This section outlines how elements of the Commission’s 
recent recast proposal, as well as the Council’s partial 
general approach, would restrict existing remedies 
and safeguards for returnees in order to accelerate the 
rate of returns. This increases the risk of inadequate 
assessments of the risks involved and therefore of 
reaching wrong decisions that put individuals in 
danger. Given the uncertainty around the fate of the 
Parliament’s report on the recast proposal at the time of 
writing, it is excluded from this analysis.  
9The proposed recast would worsen procedural 
safeguards and the access to remedies. To begin with, 
it must be noted that procedural safeguards are already 
limited. A recent European Migration Network (EMN) 
assessment of member state practices notes that the 
period of appeal is typically pushed to be as short as 
possible, since the current Return Directive does not 
specify time limits. Appeal periods are one week in 
Greece and Latvia, three days in Malta and Slovenia, 
and even 48 hours in France in certain cases.62 A 
2013 evaluation of the implementation of the Return 
Directive similarly found that certain decisions 
were only reviewed on procedure and not on their 
merits, information about available remedies was not 
always communicated to third country nationals, and 
deficiencies were observed in timely and free legal aid.63 
The scrutiny and procedural safeguards 
involved in returns are being reduced in 
order to expel individuals faster.
q  First, the Commission’s recast proposal would further 
weaken these safeguards by establishing a maximum 
appeal period of five days when the return decision 
follows a decision refusing asylum. Member states 
would be free to establish an even shorter period 
with no required minimum.64 In other cases, where 
the return decision has not been preceded by a 
negative asylum decision, member states would be 
able to establish their own periods of appeal, again 
without an indicated minimum period, as is the case 
in the current Return Directive. In its partial general 
approach, the Council makes modest changes. It 
would set a maximum period of 14 days for appeals 
in general.65 In the event that the return decision is 
issued with a rejected asylum application, it deletes the 
Commission’s five-day maximum yet calls on member 
states to establish “the shortest time limits”. Both 
proposals open the door to unreasonably short periods 
of appeal that would restrict individuals’ ability to 
obtain legal aid and prepare an effective action.66
q  Second, both proposals would weaken safeguards 
when the return decision follows an assessment 
in the context of an asylum procedure. If the 
risk of refoulement has already been assessed in a 
rejected asylum procedure, the Commission proposal 
would limit the suspensive effect of appeals based 
on the risk of refoulement.67 Under the Council’s 
position, the risk of refoulement would not be 
verified again.68 An exception would apply in both 
cases if findings arise that significantly modify 
the circumstances of the case. When refoulement 
has not been previously assessed, the Commission 
would still treat appeals on the basis of refoulement 
as automatically suspensive, whereas the Council 
would allow member states to treat an appeal on 
non-refoulement grounds as suspensive, either 
automatically or upon request by the returnee.69 
Both proposals open the door to 
unreasonably short periods of appeal.
ECtHR case law has repeatedly emphasised the 
importance of the suspensive effect of appeals on 
non-refoulement grounds.70 Otherwise, individuals 
risk being sent to persecution before the extent of 
the risk has been determined, causing irreversible 
damage. Furthermore, the effort to link asylum and 
return procedures71 is problematic. The assumption 
that non-refoulement claims must have been 
thoroughly reviewed during asylum procedures 
is incorrect, since the object and scope of judicial 
review in the two cases are not identical. As has 
been noted by the European Council on Refugees 
and Exiles (ECRE), the European Union Agency for 
Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the EPRS among 
others, the Qualification Directive does not consider 
all grounds that could amount to refoulement, and 
individuals who would nevertheless face persecution 
if returned may be refused international protection 
on procedural or technical grounds.72 This is the case 
for a non-trivial proportion of rejected applications.73 
The asylum and return acquis are distinct and should 
not be conflated. 
The asylum and return acquis are distinct 
and should not be conflated.
q  Third and finally, these concerns are exacerbated 
in the case of accelerated procedures at border 
posts, which the proposal puts forward and which 
would be retained by the Council. As per the proposal, 
individuals who had been rejected in an accelerated 
asylum procedure as established by the recast Asylum 
Procedures Regulation (which has not yet been 
adopted), would go through an accelerated return 
procedure. Some member states have recently begun 
using accelerated procedures, but their use remains 
disparate and is limited in scope.74 The Asylum 
Procedures and Return recast proposals are an 
attempt to mainstream the practice. The Commission 
proposes a maximum of 48 hours for an appeal, 
whereas the Council would extend it to between 48 
hours and one week.75 A reasoned explanation of the 
return decision would be replaced with standard ‘tick-
box’ forms, with factsheets explaining their contents 
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available in as few as five languages.76 As such,  
many third country nationals may not understand  
the return decision and could struggle to appeal  
it effectively.77  
Individuals that are returned following 
the border procedure would likely face 
a disproportionate risk of erroneous 
decisions, potentially amounting  
to refoulement. 
Where accelerated asylum procedures have been 
employed in the past, they significantly increase 
the rejection rate to just under 90%, from 61% 
on average.78 This could indicate that stricter 
standards are being applied than in normal asylum 
determination processes, or that diminished 
safeguards are changing the outcomes. ECRE and 
the Danish Refugee Council, for example, have 
warned of superficial assessments of claims, poorly 
conducted interviews, insufficient vulnerability 
assessments, and excessive weight being given to 
the applicant’s nationality.79 Individuals that are 
returned following the border procedure would likely 
face a disproportionate risk of erroneous decisions, 
potentially amounting to refoulement. 
2.2   INFORMALISATION OF READMISSION 
AGREEMENTS
The urgency accorded to increasing returns is not 
limited to the drive to reform the Return Directive, but 
also reflected in cooperation with third countries. EU 
readmission partnerships are increasingly taking on 
an informal nature. It is stated policy to prioritise 
“improving structured practical cooperation” and 
“not necessarily formal readmission agreements”.80 
As such, official readmission agreements are being 
complemented and replaced by a new generation of 
agreements that are presented as non-legally binding. 
Since 2015, there have been over a dozen EU or EU-wide 
informal partnerships, whereas only one formal 
agreement has been concluded by the Commission (with 
Belarus in September 2019).81
This shift has multiple motivations. A common 
justification is that third countries are more likely to 
agree to informal agreements.82 Readmission deals 
are often unpopular in countries of origin, and widely 
publicised agreements can face public backlash. 
Informal agreements also allow more flexibility to 
respond to changing circumstances and reduce the cost 
of defection.83 Given the historically unequal, donor-
recipient footing84 on which most negotiations with 
countries of origin are conducted, EU priorities are also 
likely to strongly influence the format of negotiations. 
As noted by Cassarino, in Europe, where increasing the 
rate of returns is politically urgent, there is an interest 
in reducing ratification delays domestically.85
This drive for flexibility poses two key challenges: 
q  First, the new generation of agreements permits a 
far lesser degree of democratic scrutiny. Since the 
2007 Lisbon Treaty, the European Parliament must 
approve the conclusion of international agreements 
and be informed at all stages of negotiation.86 
Unlike official readmission agreements, informal 
partnerships do not need to be debated or approved 
by the European Parliament or undergo a lengthy 
process of ratification and oversight. Some efforts 
have been made to inform the Parliament on the state 
of negotiations on informal agreements, yet these 
are sporadic, and MEPs have raised concerns about 
lacking access to the text of certain agreements and 
information on their costs or risks.87
Informal agreements are generally not publicly 
available. By contrast, formal readmission agreements 
must be published in the Official Journal of the 
European Union.88 This has implications beyond 
parliamentary overview. Due to the obscure process 
of negotiation, any public involvement through media 
attention or advocacy by civil society organisations 
is restricted to taking place only after an agreement’s 
conclusion, or not at all where an agreement is 
not published. The barrier to withdrawing and 
backtracking from concluded agreements can be 
expected to be higher than halting or influencing 
negotiations: this renders democratic scrutiny 
substantially less effective.
q  Second, the informal nature of the agreements 
creates substantial legal uncertainty. These 
arrangements tend to explicitly state that they do 
not create rights and obligations for their signatories 
under international law. Nevertheless the extent 
to which they can still be legally binding is subject 
to debate.89 Commentators have pointed to the 
language used (“will”, “agree to”) and detail of the 
commitments, including specific dates and figures 
or the creation of monitoring working groups, which 
often closely resemble international treaties and seem 
to create legal effects.90 Independent of the possible 
legal effects, it is clear that judicial scrutiny of these 
agreements is much less straightforward. As noted by 
Molinari, when agreements are informal, their explicit 
legal basis does not need to be stated. Unlike official 
EU agreements, their legality and compliance with 
the Treaties cannot be reviewed by the CJEU either 
ex ante, before the agreement enters into force, or at 
a later stage, in the context of a procedure borne out 
of a specific return action.91 The lack of clarity as to 
their legal effects, furthermore, makes it difficult to 
establish a direct causal link between the agreement 
and an unlawful return. Overall, this limits returnees’ 
and others’ ability to challenge the agreement.
Several recent agreements, such as the EU-Turkey 
Statement of March 2016,92 the Joint Way Forward with 
Afghanistan of October 2016,93 the EU-Bangladesh 
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Standard Operating Procedures of September 2017,94 
and the Admission Procedures agreed with Ethiopia in 
January 2018,95 have all bypassed any kind of democratic 
scrutiny and fall outside of the CJEU’s jurisdiction. Other 
recent arrangements with Guinea, The Gambia, and 
Cote d’Ivoire are not publicly available.96 Similarly, at 
national level, Italy’s Memorandum of Understanding 
with Sudan of August 201697 was never ratified by the 
Italian parliament and only publicised after 48 Sudanese 
nationals were expelled to Khartoum.98 In all cases, key 
questions were beyond review, including the legality, 
necessity, effectiveness or potential aftermath of the 
respective agreements.  
The agreements that have emerged from 
this accountability gap include states that 
are experiencing ongoing conflict or are 
refugee-producing.
The agreements that have emerged from this 
accountability gap have had highly problematic 
outcomes, since they include states that are 
experiencing ongoing conflict or are refugee-producing, 
most notably Sudan (which had a 55% recognition rate 
for international protection across the EU in 2018), 
Turkey (47%) and Afghanistan (46%).99 Although 
the risks of refoulement can differ between regions 
and are based on individuals’ particular profiles 
and vulnerabilities, in many cases, the risks remain 
significant. The situation in Afghanistan is illustrative. 
The Joint Way Forward with Afghanistan was agreed in 
2016,100 and 34,396 return decisions of Afghan nationals 
were reported by member states in 2016, followed by 
over 18,000 annually in 2017 and 2018.101 The agreement 
and the rise in returns took place in a context of rising 
hostilities that were widely reported by civil society, 
particularly ECRE102 and Amnesty International,103 as 
well as UNHCR.104 In addition to dire humanitarian 
circumstances, these reports outlined the inability of the 
Afghan government to deal with a surge in the number 
of returnees, and the particular risk of persecution faced 
by those that had spent long periods abroad. UNHCR 
issued an assessment in August 2018 stating that, due 
to the deteriorating situation in the country, Kabul, 
ostensibly one of the safest areas of Afghanistan, could 
not be considered safe for returns.105 This has, however, 
not led to suspension of the Joint Way Forward 
with Afghanistan or returns to Kabul. Following 
UNHCR’s assessment, Finland decided to pause, revise 
and then reinstate deportations to Afghanistan. Other 
member states have not reviewed their policy on 
returns to Afghanistan and no public EU statement has 
recommended that they do so.106 On the contrary, several 
member states have accelerated returns to Afghanistan 
in 2019,107 as violence soared.108
3.  Bilateralism and blurred authorship
Member states play a substantial role in implementing 
return and readmission policies. In addition to carrying 
out the majority of returns (some are conducted by 
Frontex), most readmission agreements with third 
countries are reached at national level: member states 
have over 300 bilateral agreements with non-EU 
countries, corresponding with their different national 
priorities and historical relationships.109 While this 
is not novel, a more recent trend sees the creation 
of readmission agreements where their authorship 
is blurred for strategic purposes. Multiple recent 
agreements have involved EU resources and support, 
without facing corresponding EU-level scrutiny. Second, 
the divergences between member state practices can 
give rise to inconsistent national return practices, 
including partnerships with countries that others would 
consider unsafe. This calls for greater EU oversight.
Multiple recent agreements have involved 
EU resources and support, without facing 
corresponding EU-level scrutiny.
3.1   BLURRING OF RESPONSIBILITIES FOR 
READMISSION AGREEMENTS
In a trend related to informalisation as discussed above, 
agreements that circumvent EU legal frameworks and 
institutions increasingly blur the lines between EU and 
member state responsibilities. As Slominski and Trauner 
have argued, states tend to employ a “strategic 
non-use of the EU” in readmission cooperation.110 
Whereas member states often rely on EU resources to 
increase their rate of returns, they also, conversely, often 
deliberately avoid employing EU channels, instruments 
or procedures, when circumventing them can make 
cooperation with third countries swifter. In these 
cases, EU-wide or national readmission agreements 
will be reached without the appropriate institutional 
scrutiny faced by EU agreements, while at the same 
time mobilising EU bodies and resources to support 
their implementation. The situation is further obscured 
when agreements are informal, since these have no clear 
signatory. They may be published as a press statement or 
not at all, leaving their authorship as an open question.111
The EU-Turkey Statement is a key example and the 
focus of extensive scholarship. In a controversial order in 
February 2017 following a legal challenge by three asylum 
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seekers, the CJEU determined that it was not competent 
to hear legal cases against the Statement, arguing that the 
agreement should be attributed not to the EU but to the 
representatives of signatory member states.112 In this way, 
despite being concluded at the fringes of an EU Summit, 
being presented as an EU agreement and with EU bodies 
mobilised to monitor and fund its implementation,113 the 
agreement escaped the relevant democratic and judicial 
scrutiny at EU level. This was precisely the intention: 
the European Council and the Commission argued in 
court that the agreement was not intended to create 
legal effects but was a political arrangement and, in any 
event, was agreed by member states without institutional 
involvement.114 The same is true for Italy’s Memorandum 
of Understanding with Libya. The European Council 
was instrumental in coordinating the adoption of 
their agreement at an EU Summit, endorsed it in the 
subsequent Malta Declaration, and committed funds 
to Libya within the agreement’s framework, without 
corresponding legal responsibility for its outcomes.115  
The EU-Turkey Statement was never 
approved by the European Parliament,  
but it was crucially not debated in  
national parliaments either.
This blurring of responsibilities between the EU and 
its member states has implications for democratic and 
judicial scrutiny, further complicating the challenges 
identified in the previous section on informalisation: 
q  First, the difficulty in determining who is 
responsible for an agreement creates a blind 
spot in democratic accountability. The EU-Turkey 
Statement was never approved by the European 
Parliament, but it was crucially not debated in national 
parliaments either. Agreements under negotiation 
are thus not discussed in any public forum either 
at national or EU level. Following an agreement’s 
adoption, the public’s ability to hold representatives to 
account remains limited, since it may be unclear who 
has the capacity to stop or change it. 
q  Second, it hinders judicial scrutiny and the easy 
identification of legal responsibility. The role 
of the CJEU in particular is sidelined: the Court 
is poorly positioned to determine the legality of 
agreements that could lead to refoulement when 
these are attributed to member states rather than EU 
institutions. As such, the only attempt to challenge 
the legality of a readmission agreement to date 
(the EU-Turkey Statement) was found inadmissible. 
This role can, to an extent, be played by national 
courts and the ECtHR, and indeed both sets of 
judiciaries have played an active role in confronting 
dangerous return practices, not least in relation 
to returns to Turkey from Greece.116 Nevertheless, 
an important legal avenue is excluded, and the 
process of challenging an agreement that led to 
refoulement becomes much more complicated. Third 
country nationals seeking to block returns under a 
readmission agreement would have to prove that the 
agreement is indeed a legally binding treaty (when 
it was presented as informal), and identify the most 
suitable court for their case while proving that the 
agreement’s signatory falls under its jurisdiction 
(when its authors are unclear). In many cases, these 
new obstacles may preclude full judicial scrutiny. 
In many cases, these new obstacles may 
preclude full judicial scrutiny.
3.2   DISCREPANCIES IN NATIONAL RETURN 
PRACTICES
Member states have wide discrepancies in their return 
practices, resulting from different national contexts 
and limited harmonisation. These discrepancies arise 
across return procedures themselves, the definitions 
states employ, and the information that they collect and 
provide to EU bodies. This poses two problems:
q  The first concerns the lack of meaningful 
information on returns at national or EU level. 
For several countries, data on basic parameters is 
not available, such as on the grounds and length of 
detention, whether voluntary returns took place, 
when return decisions were issued, or the use of entry 
bans.117 For example, Germany, Finland, Cyprus, the 
Netherlands, the UK, Lithuania, and until recently 
Greece, Austria and Czechia do not differentiate 
between voluntary and forced return in their data 
collection.118 These deficiencies in data collection 
leave most of the facts related to return “in the 
dark” for both the public and policymakers.119 A 
further complication relates to how existing data is 
released. For example, there is no publicly available 
information on the number of returns by country 
of destination, only by country of nationality of 
the returnee.120 This amounts to a considerable 
impediments, since in reality third country nationals 
are regularly returned to countries that are not their 
country of nationality.121 In any case, this data is only 
collected on a voluntary basis from member states 
and is therefore largely incomplete.122 This makes 
it difficult for the public to determine who is being 
returned, how, and to where.
q  Second, member states’ differing understandings 
of what constitutes a safe third country for 
returns poses distinct problems. One member 
state may sign a readmission agreement with, and/
or conduct returns to, a country that other member 
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states would deem unsafe. The predominance of 
bilateral readmission agreements prompts questions 
about the need for closer EU oversight.
Sudan123 and Libya,124 with whom Italy holds 
Memoranda of Understanding, are a case in point. 
In Libya, reports of extensive abuse of migrants are 
widespread,125 and UNHCR statements in 2018126 and 
2019127 urged states to suspend all forced returns to 
Libya. Despite this, deportations appear to have been 
ongoing up until at least 2018.128 In Sudan, there 
have been consistent allegations of abuse against 
individuals deported by Italy, Belgium, France and 
the UK,129 as well as multiple ECtHR rulings against 
deportations.130 Despite this, returns were only 
briefly suspended by Belgium from December 2017 
to February 2018,131 and have since continued.132 
Similarly, Spain has conducted repeated summary 
expulsions without due process to Morocco, despite 
allegations of abuse faced by returnees.133 Most 
recently, these included a pushback of 114 people in 
August 2018, employing a readmission agreement 
from 1992.134 
Deficiencies in data collection leave most 
of the facts related to return “in the dark” 
for both the public and policymakers. 
There is no consensus on how the EU should address 
problematic bilateral agreements or national return 
practices. Sometimes, these may not even be known. 
The possibility for the EU to provide guidance on 
countries that could not be considered safe for returns 
has been discussed repeatedly, yet this never gained 
ground.135 However, as Cassarino has argued, since 
return is an area of shared competences, there is a role 
for the Commission to monitor bilateral agreements’ 
compliance with the treaties, including with enshrined 
fundamental rights.136 Just as there is a need for greater 
scrutiny over the compliance with non-refoulement of 
readmission cooperation at EU level, similar safeguards 
are needed at national level. 
In the absence of harmonisation, several 
countries have suspended Dublin transfers 
to member states where there was a risk of 
onward deportations to unsafe countries.
The current lack of EU involvement has 
repercussions for trust and cooperation within 
the Union. In the absence of harmonisation, several 
countries have suspended Dublin transfers to member 
states where there was a risk of onward deportations to 
unsafe countries. For example, last year France halted 
transfers of Afghan asylum seekers to several countries 
that have persistently divergent recognition rates and 
conduct large numbers of returns to Afghanistan.137 
Transfers to Hungary were effectively suspended 
across the EU in 2018, partly due to the risk of indirect 
refoulement to Serbia and onward under Hungary’s 
safe third country policy.138 Courts have also recently 
blocked transfers on indirect refoulement grounds from 
Germany to Greece and Sweden, Belgium to Bulgaria, 
Switzerland to Croatia, and Italy to Norway.139 The costs 
in interstate trust and cooperation of side-lining non-
refoulement concerns can be felt across other aspects of 
EU migration policy.
4.  Lack of monitoring
Given the risks inherent in return operations, 
particularly regarding direct and indirect refoulement, 
there is a need to ensure that they are conducted 
in a controlled way and in full awareness of their 
implications. Nevertheless, EU return practices are far 
from reaching this goal. Neither the EU institutions nor 
member states have systems in place to track individuals 
following expulsion from their territory. Therefore, 
member states are poorly positioned to guarantee 
the safety of returnees or to enact conditions on 
their protection in readmission agreements with 
third countries. This section discusses, first, the 
implications of the absence of monitoring mechanisms 
for returnees’ safety and the risk of indirect refoulement 
in particular. Second, it considers the extent to 
which the recast Return Directive proposal addresses 
these challenges or, conversely, further obscures and 
complicates the consequences of return.
4.1   HIDDEN CONSEQUENCES OF 
READMISSION AGREEMENTS
As reports from several countries of readmission have 
highlighted, post-return, no institution collects 
information on the conditions, integration prospects, 
or further mobility of returnees.140 Whereas member 
states are obliged to monitor conditions throughout 
the return process, this obligation ends at the point of 
arrival in the third country. In receiving states, in turn, 
provisions for continued monitoring and support for 
returnees’ integration tend to be extremely limited. Much 
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of the available infrastructure is run by the International 
Organisation for Migration (IOM), with member states 
facing increasing pressure to develop reintegration 
programmes, but this has so far been limited to cases of 
voluntary return.141 Those subject to forced return, who 
are most at risk, are not tracked or supported. In effect, 
individuals are “returned and lost”.142 
In effect, individuals are “returned  
and lost”.
The lack of data on returnees’ fate has several 
implications:
q  First, it prevents a comprehensive evaluation 
of the fundamental rights compliance of any 
readmission agreement, in particular with regard 
to non-refoulement.143 Where evaluations have been 
conducted, such as progress reports of the EU-Turkey 
Statement, these have been criticised by the European 
Ombudsman for a lack of analysis, specificity, or 
consideration of human rights risks.144 Problematic 
readmission agreements and returns to dangerous 
third countries risk remaining operational indefinitely. 
For instance, when consequences for returnees remain 
obscured, they do not inform assessments of conditions 
in the country for future return decisions. 
q  Second, the lack of information hinders the 
inclusion of non-refoulement conditions in 
readmission partnerships. Following pressure 
from the European Parliament and civil society, 
formal readmission agreements after 2005 have 
included a non-affection clause, which states that 
the agreement is without prejudice to international 
law requirements.145 However, this remains non-
committal and far from a guarantee against human 
rights violations after the conclusion of the return 
operation. There is no specific protection for 
returnees’ rights, nor with respect to secondary 
expulsion to states that may not respect those 
rights. Furthermore, the non-affection clause is 
not accompanied by consequences or remedies: 
readmission agreements do not include a suspension 
clause that calls for a halt to returns if new 
information surfaces regarding a country’s failure to 
protect returnees. As a result, there are no actionable 
guarantees of returnees’ protection.
Considerations of the risk of indirect refoulement are 
notably absent. Even when partner states themselves 
appear safe, they may pose a risk of indirect 
refoulement. Several partner countries are not parties 
to the Refugee Convention (or only partially, such as 
Turkey),146 lack a functional asylum system, or do not 
recognise refugee status, such as Libya and Pakistan.147 
As such, they may be poorly equipped to assess returnees’ 
claims to international protection fairly or sufficiently 
assess the risk of refoulement before deporting them 
onward. Third countries may have incentives to deport 
non-nationals further, without sufficiently or correctly 
assessing the risk of refoulement. Accepting returnees 
of another nationality can be politically unpopular 
and economically burdensome for third countries, in 
particular since it is uncertain that their countries of 
origin would or could take them back.148 The increasing 
EU pressure (for example through the withdrawal of visa 
rights) may however induce these countries to accept 
non-nationals without being able or willing to settle 
them, or guarantee their safety. This is particularly the 
case for countries of transit that are overburdened by 
arrivals and readmissions from multiple directions at 
once, like most North African states, Turkey, or Niger.149 
Considerations of the risk of indirect 
refoulement are notably absent.
For example, Turkey has readmission agreements with 
Syria, Yemen and Pakistan, among others.150 In 2016, it 
began negotiating others with Iraq, Afghanistan, Eritrea, 
Iran, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Myanmar, 
Somalia, Sudan and other refugee-producing states.151 The 
risk for migrants returned to Turkey under the EU-Turkey 
Statement to be sent to states that will not protect their 
rights, thereby violating non-refoulement, is significant. 
This is all the more so since returns to Turkey under the 
Statement have included nationals of states with whom 
Turkey has been pursuing readmission agreements.152 
Recent reports of the mass expulsion of over 6,000 Syrians 
in a single month show the significance of the risks at 
play.153 This is part of a drive to deport 80,000 people in 
2019,154 and follows mass deportations of Afghan nationals 
in April and May 2018.155
Other priority EU partners have been similarly accused 
of refoulement and collective migrant expulsions in 
violation of international law. These include Cameroon, 
which has systematically expelled thousands of Nigerian 
refugees back across the border, prompting regular 
condemnations from UNHCR and NGOs.156 Nigeria 
expelled 47 Cameroonian asylum seekers to Cameroon in 
2018.157 A violent crackdown against irregular migrants in 
Angola in 2018 saw 330,000 people reportedly expelled 
to the Democratic Republic of Congo.158 Finally, Morocco 
and Algeria have regularly conducted mass deportations 
of migrants into Sub-Saharan Africa, involving widespread 
allegations of abuse.159 EU negotiations to strengthen 
cooperation are ongoing with Algeria, Nigeria and 
Morocco, and informal readmission arrangements already 
exist with all three states, whereas several bilateral 
agreements exist with Angola160 and Cameroon.161
These agreements make no meaningful attempt to 
improve the available protections. None of the publicly 
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available agreements concluded since 2016 make 
reference to a monitoring mechanism to determine the 
fate of returnees at risk or include a suspension clause to 
halt the agreement in the event that credible allegations 
of direct or indirect refoulement surface. On the 
contrary, certain harmful practices are encouraged. 
Far from discouraging indirect refoulement, the EU and 
member states sometimes actively promote it. Third 
countries have been encouraged to accelerate returns 
and establish their own readmission agreements with 
additional countries, which may include countries that 
are considered unsafe. For instance, Turkey’s pursuit 
of the readmission agreements listed above in 2016 is 
not coincidental, but rather was a requirement set by 
the visa liberalisation roadmap launched with the EU 
in 2013.162 The roadmap states a criterion for Turkey to 
“effectively seek to conclude and implement readmission 
agreements with the countries that represent sources of 
important illegal migration flows directed towards Turkey 
or the EU member states”. 163 Similarly, Article 2 of Italy’s 
Memorandum of Understanding with Libya includes a 
provision on cooperation with returning migrants from 
Libya to other African states.164  
Far from discouraging indirect 
refoulement, the EU and member states 
sometimes actively promote it.
While the establishment of an efficient readmission 
network between countries of origin and transit may 
be helpful to EU objectives of speeding up returns and 
deterring irregular migration, it significantly raises the 
risk of indirect refoulement.
4.2   REDUCED CONTROL POST-RETURN IN THE 
RETURN DIRECTIVE
The lack of information regarding returns has been 
the subject of ample calls for reform from academics, 
NGOs and from within EU institutions.165 In 2011, a 
Commission evaluation of readmission agreements 
recommended the introduction of suspensive clauses 
into such agreements in the event of fundamental rights 
violations, requirements on human rights compliance 
in the treatment of returnees, and the establishment 
of post-return monitoring mechanisms.166 In 2016, 
the European Parliament expressed concern at the 
inadequate follow-up of forced return decisions, and 
called for similar measures.167 However, this has not 
been reflected in the formal or informal agreements 
concluded since.
On the contrary, the recast Return Directive proposal 
constitutes a missed opportunity for reform and 
further diminishes monitoring and control over the 
outcomes of return. First, the proposed recast limits 
opportunities for voluntary departure. Second, the 
Council’s partial general approach reflects a troubling 
trend of returning individuals to third countries to 
which they have no connection. Both trends have 
a number of implications for (particularly indirect) 
refoulement.
q  First, the Commission’s proposal would prioritise 
forced return over voluntary departure, in 
contradiction to core principles of EU return 
policy until now. The recast, while retaining a 
maximum of 30 days for voluntary returns, removes 
the minimum of seven days.168 State practices 
suggest that this is far from sufficient time to enable 
voluntary departure, and precludes the establishment 
of pre-departure advice and reintegration 
programmes.169 The proposal would also prohibit the 
possibility of voluntary departure in multiple cases, 
including when individuals pose a risk of absconding, 
when individuals do not cooperate at all stages of 
return procedures, or as a rule within the border 
procedure.170 As highlighted by legal scholars, the 
definition of a risk of absconding, which is introduced 
for the first time in this proposal, is exceptionally 
broad and includes almost all individuals subject 
to return.171 The criteria include a lack of identity 
documentation, fixed residence or financial resources, 
or the illegal entry or unauthorised movement into 
or between member states.172 Also of concern is 
the obligation placed on third country nationals 
to cooperate with return procedures, including by 
contacting authorities of their country of origin to 
verify their identity or request a travel document.173 
There are good reasons why third country nationals 
may be unwilling to contact their country of origin, 
particularly if they believe there to be a risk of 
reprisals from government authorities upon return. 
Denying these individuals an opportunity to depart 
voluntarily would increase the risks they face and 
may penalise them unfairly. On voluntary return, 
the Council echoes the Commission’s restrictions. 
Under the Council’s partial general approach, the 
duty to cooperate would be expanded and, although 
the definition of the risk of absconding is somewhat 
amended, it would remain exceedingly broad and keep 
the criteria on irregular entry or transit.174 
If forced return increasingly replaces 
voluntary departure, the real consequences 
of returns may become further obscured.
These changes would lead to a loss of individuals’ 
control over their own return and an expanded use of 
detention when voluntary departure is denied. They 
would also restrict the already limited possibilities 
for monitoring post-return. Currently, and as per 
the recast proposal and Council approach, the only 
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formal mechanisms in place to assess returnees’ 
wellbeing or support their reintegration are restricted 
to voluntary return.175 If forced return increasingly 
replaces voluntary departure, the real consequences 
of returns may become further obscured, including 
the risks of indirect refoulement through secondary 
expulsion.
q  Second, the Council seeks to affirm the possibility 
of returning third country nationals to any 
third country, whereas previously return was only 
envisioned to countries of origin or transit, or to 
another third country only with the consent of the 
returnee.176 This change reflects the European priority 
in readmission negotiations for third countries to 
readmit non-nationals, and a growing return practice. 
Of returns reported on Eurostat, 15% of returnees in 
2018 ended up in a country other than their country 
of nationality, up from 9% in 2017.177 
The practice of ‘returning’ an individual to a 
country where they have never lived and to which 
they have no meaningful connection raises several 
questions and ignores UNHCR recommendations.178 
In particular, as discussed in the previous section, 
it places individuals at risk of secondary expulsions 
amounting to refoulement. The consequences for 
returnees, including potential indirect refoulement, 
will depend heavily on the institutions and 
protections available in the country of return, such 
as reception conditions, regularisation or voluntary 
return programmes, and an adequate asylum system.  
The consequences for returnees, including 
potential indirect refoulement, will depend 
heavily on the institutions and protections 
available in the country of return.
Discussions in the Council reportedly focused on the 
Western Balkans as potential countries of return.179 
Despite their presumed alignment with EU asylum 
standards as they advance in accession procedures, 
significant concerns remain regarding their 
exceptionally low recognition rates, the inadequacy of 
non-refoulement assessments and the standardised 
use of safe third country policies.180 Nevertheless, 
the Western Balkans are not named explicitly, so this 
provision leaves the door open for other states with 
even fewer safeguards in place. A careful assessment 
of conditions and incentives to ensure that any 
country of return can uphold the relevant standards 
will be paramount.
Conclusions and key recommendations
In the months to come, returns will remain prominent 
in the EU’s migration policy agenda, particularly as the 
Commission’s efforts to pursue readmission agreements 
with third countries are sustained and discussions 
on the recast Return Directive continue. The EU and 
its member states must, however, take stock of the 
implications of current policies for fundamental rights 
in the next legislative cycle.  
The drive to accelerate the rate of returns 
has led to a substantial reduction in 
accountability over who is expelled,  
how, and to where.
The drive to accelerate the rate of returns has led to 
a substantial reduction in accountability over who is 
expelled, how, and to where. On one hand, the rise in the 
number of informal, bilateral and blurred-authorship 
readmission agreements, and the continued failure to 
monitor conditions post-return, have created a veil 
that reduces democratic and judicial scrutiny. This 
has resulted in a growing number of agreements with 
countries that pose a risk of refoulement. In the cases 
discussed in this paper, NGOs and academics have raised 
the alarm that migrants are being returned to potentially 
unsafe states, in violation of the principle of non-
refoulement. It is telling that, despite overwhelming 
condemnation from civil society, agreements such as 
the EU-Turkey Statement181 and the Joint Way Forward 
with Afghanistan182 both remain operational today. The 
risk may be one of direct refoulement, where countries 
themselves are accused of persecution, are conflict-
ridden, or are refugee-producing. It may also be indirect, 
where countries that lack functional asylum systems or 
have partnerships with unsafe third countries may expel 
individuals onward to persecution. In both regards, 
the EU and its member states risk falling short of 
international legal obligations. 
At the same time, the recent proposal for a recast of 
the Return Directive constitutes a missed opportunity 
for reform. Its emphasis on making returns more 
effective has not been complemented by a similar focus 
on strengthening protections or making returns more 
sustainable. On the contrary, key provisions in the 
Commission’s proposal and the Council’s partial general 
approach compromise procedural safeguards, notably 
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on the right to appeal, the suspensive effect thereof, 
and the assessment of the risk of refoulement. These 
elements will, in all likelihood, increase the number of 
erroneous decisions that send individuals into danger. 
Equally concerning are proposed limitations on 
voluntary departure and the possibility introduced 
by the Council of returning individuals to countries 
other than those of origin or transit.  
The proliferation of readmission 
agreements with unsafe states demands 
that there exist careful procedural 
safeguards in return practices.
The simultaneous weakening of safeguards in return 
practices and readmission cooperation must be 
considered jointly, since they are produced by the 
same policy objective and carry the same consequence 
of exacerbating the risk of refoulement. Indeed, they 
produce a perilous synergy.
For example, signing a readmission agreement 
with a country is distinct from actually conducting 
returns to that country. It is possible that, even if 
readmission cooperation mechanisms are established 
with unsafe states, the required case-by-case assessment 
of each returnee’s circumstances ensures that they 
are not met with disproportionate risk of refoulement. 
However, these trends in readmission cooperation are 
still worrisome for three reasons. First, as this paper has 
highlighted, it is not clear that thorough assessments 
are being carried out in practice, and the recast Return 
Directive proposal has the potential to weaken these 
safeguards further. Second, the end goal of readmission 
agreements is to accelerate each return procedure. 
If they are effective, they may increase the risk of 
individuals being returned too promptly, while their 
attempt to appeal a return decision is pending. This 
assumes that the appeal in question is not suspensive, 
whereas currently appeals on a non-refoulement basis 
automatically suspend a return decision. However, as 
noted in this paper, the recast Return Directive could be 
set to change that.183 Third, the fact that an agreement is 
signed and sustained is a clear indication of an intention 
and willingness to return considerable numbers of 
individuals to that country. In particular, the existence 
of readmission partnerships could be the best indication 
of where returnees end up. Eurostat data on returnees’ 
country of destination (rather than only their country 
of nationality) is lacking and imprecise, only collected 
from member states on a voluntary basis, and does not 
differentiate between forced and voluntary return.184
In other words, the proliferation of readmission 
agreements with unsafe states demands that there exist 
careful procedural safeguards in return practices, so 
that this cooperation is not abused and fundamental 
rights are respected. However, as this paper has shown, 
the political urgency accorded to increasing returns 
leads to the opposite conclusion. Safeguards are being 
compromised overall.
Finally, it would be wrong to conclude that these trends 
and reduced safeguards are worthwhile as long as they 
fulfil the objective of making returns more effective. 
First, insofar as the goal is to increase the number of 
returns, it is far from clear that the trends discussed 
in this paper achieve this. The recast Return Directive 
proposal was not accompanied by an impact assessment, 
nor by evidence to suggest that a punitive approach to 
return procedures is more likely to induce compliance. 
In fact, as the EPRS’ substitute impact assessment 
suggests, the opposite may be true.185 When migrants 
in an irregular situation are threatened with longer 
detention periods, no right to depart voluntarily, entry 
bans, or substantial fines, they may be more likely 
to abscond than when a cooperative environment is 
fostered.186 Regarding readmission, informal agreements 
that avoid public scrutiny may be easier to establish, 
yet this may come at a cost in predictability and 
enforceability that can render them ineffective, since the 
cost of defection is lower.187 
An effective return and readmission 
system should seek to promote sustainable 
returns.
Second, it is pertinent to challenge the narrow 
definition of effective returns. Evaluating return 
policy purely through numbers of individuals exiting 
Europe does not only miss a crucial fundamental 
rights component: it is also myopic. This approach 
ignores questions such as the sustainability of return or 
returnees’ reintegration prospects, both clearly desirable 
policy goals that avoid situations of migrants ‘in orbit’, 
facing persecution, or attempting to re-enter the EU. 
An effective return and readmission system should 
seek to promote sustainable returns. This involves, 
first, strengthening rather than weakening safeguards 
to prevent direct and indirect refoulement; second, 
prioritising assisted voluntary departure; and third, 
refraining from sending individuals to countries with 
which they have no connection. It may also involve 
looking beyond return when these conditions are not met 
and giving comparable attention to alternative policies to 
address the situation of migrants without a legal right to 
remain, including regularisation programmes.
Third, the trends outlined in this paper have wide-
ranging implications for the EU’s effectiveness. For 
instance, the widely divergent national return practices, 
which sometimes lead to violations of non-refoulement, 
generate a lack of interstate trust and have led to 
suspensions of Dublin transfers between member states. 
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The principle of sincere cooperation is also increasingly 
undermined between institutions, whenever Parliament 
is side-lined in readmission cooperation. Neither trend 
is conducive to an effective EU migration policy. 
A review of protections against 
refoulement in the return and readmission 
system, and appropriate attention to 
increasing protections are urgently needed.
Compliance with fundamental rights and the principle 
of non-refoulement is not mutually exclusive with a 
robust return and readmission system. Rather, ensuring 
that return procedures entail appropriate scrutiny, 
accountability and control over the consequences is 
in the EU’s interest. As such, a review of protections 
against refoulement in the return and readmission 
system, and appropriate attention to increasing 
protections are urgently needed.
In view of this, the paper advances the following 
two sets of recommendations concerning (i) future 
readmission cooperation and (ii) the recast Return 
Directive negotiations.
Recommendations concerning future readmission 
cooperation
q  The Commission and the Council should reconsider 
their strategy of prioritising informal over 
formal cooperation in the next legislative cycle. 
Informal partnerships lead to reduced control over 
the agreements’ implementation, limit the available 
legal remedies for returnees, and reduce democratic 
involvement in readmission policy within the EU, while 
being less predictable and sustainable than formal 
agreements. At the very least, the European Parliament 
should be informed at all stages of negotiation, and all 
agreements must be made public.
q  The Commission and the Council should establish 
post-return monitoring in their agreements 
with third countries. These mechanisms can be 
monitored through Joint Readmission Committees 
(JRCs) in the case of formal agreements, or the 
equivalent monitoring bodies in informal agreements 
and states’ bilateral implementing protocols and must 
include independent oversight with a rights mandate. 
These monitoring mechanisms should coordinate 
with infrastructure established by member states and 
the IOM to support reintegration following voluntary 
return and cooperate with NGOs operating in the 
country of return. 
q  An evaluation should be conducted of formal 
and informal readmission agreements at EU 
and national level, which fully reflects their 
implications, not only in terms of operability, but 
also respect for human rights and non-refoulement 
obligations. These reviews should be regular and 
periodic. This could be used to provide information on 
when refoulement has taken place, allow suspensive 
clauses to be included in these agreements, and 
be used in Country of Origin Information reports 
produced by EASO and member states to reduce 
future risks.
q  Agreements negotiated by the Commission and 
signed by the Council must include guarantees for 
returnee rights. Agreements can be useful tools 
to promote good practices and ensure compliance 
with the principles that the EU claims to uphold. 
To achieve this aim, two things are particularly 
important. First and foremost, agreements should 
not be concluded with countries that are at risk 
of violating the principle of non-refoulement 
either directly or indirectly. This assessment 
cannot be based on diplomatic assurances or states 
being a signatory to relevant conventions but must 
involve a thorough assessment by the Commission 
of human rights conditions and the adequacy of 
asylum procedures. Second, all agreements should 
include a suspensive clause. Much as an appeal on 
the grounds of refoulement should always trigger a 
suspension of the return decision, the same principle 
must be applied for readmission agreements with 
countries that pose a systemic risk of refoulement. 
As evidence emerges that suggests the country is 
no longer respecting human rights of returnees, all 
returns should be halted. This evidence can relate 
to the practice of returns to, or establishment of 
readmission agreements with, unsafe countries. 
Rather than encouraging third countries to set 
up return agreements with unsafe countries, the 
Commission must promote adequate protection 
measures down the line.
q  Readmission cooperation must be coupled with 
targeted EU support to ensure the rights 
compliance of partner states. Member states benefit 
from incentivising the cooperation of third countries 
on readmission, yet this cooperation must comply 
with international law. This should include financial 
assistance to compensate for long-term costs of 
readmission, as well as operational support and 
expertise to develop asylum and reception systems in 
third countries.
Recommendations concerning the recast Return 
Directive negotiations
Past Action Plans and Handbooks accompanying the 
Return Directive have focused exclusively on making 
returns more effective, without giving comparable 
attention to ensuring adequate safeguards and 
protections for those subject to the Directive. The 
upcoming negotiations for the recast Return Directive 
must not become a missed opportunity to ensure 
that member states’ return practices comply with 
international legal obligations, particularly the principle 
of non-refoulement. The following recommendations 
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should be considered by all institutions in ongoing 
discussions:
q  The recast Return Directive should also reflect the 
recommendations above, which concern future 
readmission cooperation. Their implementation 
into member state practices is necessary to 
ensure that they have meaningful effect, given 
the predominantly bilateral nature of readmission 
agreements. More specifically: 
q  The Directive should call on member states to 
prioritise formal over informal cooperation 
rather than the inverse, establish post-return 
monitoring mechanisms in their readmission 
agreements with third countries, and include 
suspensive clauses into these agreements 
securing respect for the fundamental rights of 
returnees. This will reduce the likelihood of 
refoulement and allow member states to adapt 
return practices to new elements of risk, while 
making readmission cooperation more predictable.
q  The Directive must recognise the notion of 
indirect refoulement. Despite being a well-
established notion in European case law, the 
prohibition on indirect refoulement is scarcely 
reflected in EU documents and legislation.188 
Without this explicit recognition, the recast risks 
failing to take into account the full extent of 
member states’ legal obligations.
q  Member states should be discouraged from 
conducting returns to countries where the 
third country national has no meaningful 
connection. These returns are not sustainable 
and increase the risk of mistreatment and indirect 
refoulement. When returns to the country of 
nationality are not possible, alternatives to 
deportation (such as assisted voluntary departure 
or regularisation) should take priority.
q  Efforts should be made to prevent the establishment 
of unsafe readmission agreements at national level. 
These pose unacceptable risks for returnees in violation 
of international law and damage cooperation and trust 
between member states, leading for example to suspend 
Dublin transfers within the EU. These efforts could 
include an updated list of binding criteria to identify 
third countries with which readmission agreements 
can or cannot be negotiated, as proposed in the 
initial negotiations for the Return Directive. These must 
consider, among others, the existence of an effective 
asylum system in the third country as well as the 
average recognition rates of asylum applications, and 
take into account all available information and reports 
from civil society organisations. It must be emphasised 
that these criteria cannot in any way replace the need 
for individual case-by-case assessments of the risk of 
refoulement in all return decisions, since the risk of 
refoulement is fundamentally individual.
q  The recast Return Directive must ensure that 
effective remedies exist to prevent violations of 
the principle of non-refoulement. Key to this is an 
appropriate period for appeals. They should always be 
of 15 days at a minimum, which CJEU case law deems 
to generally not be unreasonable, with a possibility of 
extension.189 This would allow individuals to seek legal 
assistance and prepare an effective case if necessary. 
In addition, the risk of refoulement must always be 
assessed as part of a return decision, independently of 
prior assessments under a different acquis, due to their 
different scope and considerations. An appeal on the 
grounds of a risk of refoulement must be automatically 
suspensive. If border procedures are introduced, these 
safeguards must also apply in those cases.
q  Voluntary departure must continue to be 
prioritised over forced return in accordance with the 
core principles of EU return policy. Voluntary return 
should be available to all individuals subject to return 
orders. This requires a reasonable period in which the 
individual is not detained and can therefore organise 
their departure. A minimum of 30 days should be 
established in the Return Directive for individuals to 
return voluntarily to allow them to prepare, seek advice 
and reintegration support. This would reduce the 
risk of refoulement and, absent other reforms, would 
be a prerequisite for obtaining basic information on 
the fate of returnees. Assisted voluntary return that 
include reintegration support are also more likely than 
forced return to secure cooperation from third country 
nationals and third countries themselves.
q  There is a need for better public data on return 
practices from member states in order to 
monitor compliance with the Directive and 
non-refoulement obligations. The recast Return 
Directive proposal includes the establishment of 
national Return Management Systems. As part of 
these systems, member states should be expected to 
report basic parameters for each return decision, such 
as if voluntary departure was offered and accepted. 
In particular, there is a need for standardised public 
information on returns by country of destination that 
include the nationality of the returnee and whether 
the return was forced or voluntary. Current Eurostat 
data is incomplete and poorly adapted for a reality 
in which many individuals are not returned to their 
country of nationality, thereby preventing a full 
assessment of the risks involved.
This paper has highlighted key structural shortcomings 
in the EU and member states’ efforts to prevent 
violations of the principle of non-refoulement. A 
growing accountability gap has allowed readmission 
agreements to be established and sustained with 
states that pose significant risks of direct and indirect 
refoulement. At the same time, weakening safeguards in 
the recast Return Directive may considerably increase 
the risk of erroneous assessments amounting to 
refoulement. If returns do indeed increase, so too will 
demands for accountability regarding these practices. 
Reversing these trends to comply with international law 
and protect returnees from persecution must therefore 
become a priority in the EU’s next legislative cycle. 
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